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DENATURALIZATION AND DEPORTATION OF NAZI WAR
CRIMINALS IN THE UNITED STATES: UPHOLDING
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES IN A SINGLE PROCEEDING
I. INTRODUCTION
United States legislation regarding the denaturalization and deporta-
tion of suspected Nazi war criminals1 requires change to effectuate the
United States Immigration and Naturalization Services policy. In the
late 1940s and early 1950s, many Nazi war criminals became naturalized
United States citizens.2 Today, a naturalized citizen accused of war
crimes must first be denaturalized and then deported in separate and
1. A war criminal as defined by the International Military Tribunal is an individual that
committed or conspired to commit:
(a) Crimes Against Peace: namely, planning, preparation, initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing;
(b) War Crimes: namely, violations of the laws or customs of war. Such
violations shall include, but not be limited to, murder, ill-treatment or
deportation to slave labor or for any other purpose of civilian
population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of
prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of hostages, plunder of
public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or
villages, or devastation not justified by military necessity;
(c) Crimes Against Humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement,
deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian
population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial
or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of
the domestic law of the country where perpetrated. Leaders, or-
ganizers, instigators and accomplices participating in the formulation
or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the
foregoing crimes are responsible for all acts committed by any persons
in execution of such plan.
Agreement by the Government of the United States of America, the Provisional Govern-
ment of the French Republic, the Government of the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the
European Axis, Charter of the International Military Tribunal opened for signature August
8, 1945, art. 6, 59 Stat. 1544, 1547, E.A.S. No. 472, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 [hereinafter The
London Agreement].
2. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981); United States v. Demjanjuk,
518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981); United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1985);
see also United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v.
Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Defendants in all of the above cases were at
one time naturalized citizens.
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lengthy proceedings, 3 and this dual process has been known to last as
long as a decade.4 Consequently, alleged war criminals remain in the
United States indefinitely while appealing both actions.5 The United
States Government bears the burden of proof in both proceedings and is
unnecessarily forced to argue its case twice. The precious nature of
citizenship with rights granted by the United States Constitution is an
obvious reason for the exhaustive proceedings.6 The absence of a statute
of limitations for illegal entry into the United States, however, suggests
that expelling an individual who has not met the standards of entry is as
important as protecting that individual's constitutional rights. Swift
administration of justice requires that denaturalization and deportation
be decided in one proceeding7 while continuing to uphold constitutional
rights.
In most cases, 8 suspected Nazi war criminals "illegally procured"'
United States citizenship under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948,10 the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 195211 or the Refugee Relief Act of
1953.12 In direct violation of these immigration laws, suspects willfully
3 See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1988) (originally enacted as Immigration and Nationality Act
of 1952, ch. 477, § 340(a), 66 Stat. 260); see also Alleged Nazi War Crninal. Hearings
Before the Subcomm on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1,102 (1979) [hereinafter 1979 House Hearings].
4. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 490 (the Fedorenko case is typical of deportation cases which
commonly require six or seven years of litigation in the United States as well as additional
litigation after deportation); see also Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1362 (Demjanjuk is
currently appealing a death sentence of an Israeli court); Maikovskis v. Immigration &
Naturalization Service, 773 F.2d 435, 437 (2d Cir. 1985) (stating that the INS instituted
deportation proceedings in 1976).
5. See Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 490; Demianjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1362; Maikovslds, 773
F. 2d at 435.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating "[a]lU persons born or naturalized in the United
States... are citizens of the United States .... ).
7. One method suggested by Congress for expediting deportation was to combine the
denaturalization and deportation procedures. N.Y. Times, Feb. 17, 1980, at A34, col. 1.
8. H.R. REP. No. 1452, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4700, 4702 (stating that the majority of cases concerned individuals who were
admitted under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948 or the Refugee Relief Act of 1953).
9. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1988) (originally enacted as Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, ch. 477, § 316(a), 66 Stat. 242). Section 1427(a) states that a person must be "lawfully
admitted" to the United States in order to be granted citizenship.
10. Displaced Persons Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009, amended by 64
Stat. 219 (1950) [hereinafter DPA].
11. 8 U.S.C. § 1451 (1988).
12. Refugee Relief Act of 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-203, 1953 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS (83 Stat.) 444. Because none of the suspected war criminals discussed herein entered
under this Act, it will not be addressed in the text. Under the Act refugees were given
"special nonquota status." Id. at 445. Like other post-war immigration acts, the Refugee
Relief Act was a reaction to continuing problems of displaced persons in Europe. Id at
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concealed war-time activities in order to acquire United States entry visas
and eventually became citizens. 13 Service as an armed concentration
camp guard, for example, is per se evidence that the individual lacks the
requisite "good moral character" imposed by Congress to become a
citizen.14  Concealment of such service constitutes a "material mis-
representation"U under immigration laws, and should result in exclusion,
or denaturalization in the case of the naturalized citizen. Denaturaliza-
tion/deportation proceedings require an arduous seven to ten years to
complete and have resulted in the execution of the defendant.16
The two leading cases pertaining to deportation are Fedorenko v.
United States 7 and United States v. Demjanjuk.18  In Fedorenko, the
Supreme Court for the first time, affirmed the denaturalization of a Nazi
war criminal and as a result, the decision is closely followed by other
courts.19 The defendant, Feodor Fedorenko, was subsequently deported,2
2104. The Act allowed 240,000 refugees to enter the United States with "special quota
immigrant visas." Id. at 2103.
13. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981); United States v. Demjanjuk,
518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981); United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y.
1981); United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Maikovskis v. Immigration
& Naturalization Service, 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985).
14. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1988). Section 1427(a) states in pertinent part that to be
admitted to the United States, an applicant must be "a person of good moral character,
attached to the principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the
good order of the United States." Id.
15. Materiality is a component of the law of torts that was adapted to denaturalization.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts states:
(1) Reliance upon a fraudulent misrepresentation is not justifiable
unless the matter misrepresented is material.
(2) The matter is material if
(a) a reasonable man would attach importance to its existence or nonexistence
in determining his choice of action in the transaction in question; or
(b) the maker of the representation knows or has reason to know that its
recipient regards or is likely to regard the matter as important in determin-
ing his choice of action, although a reasonable man would not so regard it.
RESrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 538 (1976).
16. See cases cited supra note 2. But see United States v. Unnas, 527 F. Supp. 426
(E.D.N.Y. 1981) (where the proceeding took approximately two years).
17. 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
18. 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
19. United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1981); United States v. Linnas,
527 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D.
Ohio 1981); Maikovskis v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir.
1985); United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. Sokolov, 814
F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1987) (all of the above cases cite Fedorenko).
20. N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1984, at A12, col. 3.
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tried by a Soviet court,21 and executed. 2 In Demjanjuk, the defendant is
currently appealing a death sentence in Israel.23 In both Fedorenko and
Demjanjuk, the defendants were denaturalized nearly thirty years after
their illegal entry to the United States, and both cases involved lengthy
proceedings of nearly a decade.24 Fedorenko resulted in an execution,25
whereas Demjanjuk resulted in a death sentence.26
An equally important case, though not as highly publicized, is United
States v. Sprogis.Y In Sprogis, the United States Government failed to
meet its stringent burden of proof, and the denaturalization suit was
dismissed. 8 Unlike Fedorenko and Demjanjuk, however, Sprogis was
disposed of in less than two years because the matter was settled in one
proceeding. The Court's decision in favor of the defendant was the sole
reason for the brief litigation period. Had the United States successfully
argued its case, further appeals by the defendant, a deportation proceed-
ing, and a trial abroad would have taken place.
The Fedorenko and Demjanjuk cases spanned nearly a decade and
resulted in an execution and a death sentence. These outcomes should
prompt Congress to reexamine the procedure of having separate
denaturalization and deportation trials. Congress should consider whether
United States law should allow Nazi war criminals residing in the United
States to live out their natural lives free from prosecution. Forty-five
years have elapsed since the conclusion of World War II, and suspected
Nazi war criminals are aging. Now more than ever, a speedy trial is of
the utmost importance. Time cannot allow the world to forget the
grotesque crimes committed by the Nazis. 29 Those responsible for the
crimes must face the consequences of their actions no matter how long
ago they were perpetrated.
West Germany sent this message to the world when it suspended
the statute of limitations on war crimes.30 The United States courts,
however, are hesitant to sacrifice constitutional principles in order to
21. Id., June 20, 1986, at A2, col. 5.
22. Id., July 28, 1987, at A3, col. 5.
23. Id., Apr. 26, 1988, at Al, col. 3.
24. -Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981); United States v. Demjanjuk, 518
F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
25. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1987, at A3, col. 5.
26. Id., Apr. 26, 1988, at Al, col. 3.
27. 763 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1985).
28. Id.
29. United States v. Sprogis, No. CV-82-1804, slip. op. at 1579 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 1984)
(stating that "we must resolve never to forget" the crimes committed by the Nazis).
30. The West German Government voted to suspend the statute of limitations on
murder, primarily to continue the prosecution of Nazi war criminals. N.Y. Times, July 4,
1979, at Al, col. 2.
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deport war criminals before their natural deaths. A delicate balance
between the right of the government to expel defendants who do not
meet the standards of citizenship and the need to safeguard the
constitutional rights of those defendants must be reached. This balance
may be achieved in a single proceeding; separate trials are unnecessary.
I. LAWS GOVERNING DENATURALIZATION AND DEPORTATION
United States courts have long recognized that citizenship is a
"priceless treasure." 31 Strict laws governing the entry of immigrants,
imposed to prevent the immigration of criminals, have historically played
a role in United States immigration policy.32 Congress requires that
immigration to the United States or acquisition of citizenship should be
granted only to "a person of good moral character, attached to the
principles of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to
the good order and happiness of the United States." 33
Membership in organizations hostile to the principles of the
Constitution and the United States is considered prima facie evidence
that an individual lacks good moral charactery' Hence, Nazi war
criminals, whose ideals were contrary to the principles of civilized nations,
were barred from entry to the United States and certainly from
application for citizenship.35 The Nazi regime offended the world by
committing crimes that have been described as contrary to "the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations." 36 The United States
Government, along with other world powers, condemned the Nazi acts
and committed themselves to bringing war criminals to justice at the
conclusion of World War 11.37 Vigorous pursuit of this policy at the
Nuremberg Trials38 resulted in the conviction and punishment of
31. Comment, Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminals: Is There Sufficient Justice for
Those Who Would Not Dispense Justice?, 40 MD. L. REv. 39, 44 (1981) (quoting Johnson
v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting)).
32. R. SrEIt, STmu. ON IMMIGRATION LAW 1-3 (1985).
33. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1988).
34. Id.
35. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 510-11 n.32 (1981).
36. Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, art. 38(1)(c), 59 Stat.
1055, T.S. No. 993.
37. The United States formalized its commitment by signing The London Agreement.
See supra note 1. Signatories included the United States, France, the Soviet Union, and
the United Kingdom. Id.
38. The London Agreement established the International Military Tribunal for the
purpose of administering justice. Because the proceedings took place in the city of
Nuremberg, they are commonly known as the Nuremberg Trials. See The London
Agreement, supra note 1.
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individuals guilty of war crimes.Y
In furtherance of this obligation, Congress instituted the Displaced
Persons Act of 1948 (the "DPA"), 40 which operated in conjunction with
the operations of the United Nations International Refugee Organization
(the "IRO"). 41  Although the DPA was implemented to insure that
individuals uprooted by the war. could freely immigrate to the United
States,42 it also sought to prevent those who participated in war-time
atrocitiese from entering the United States.44 Laws adopted after World
War II were consistent with the principles of the Constitution and
affirmed the United States' commitment to a strict immigration policy.
A. The Displaced Persons Act of 1948
The DPA, 45 the first significant immigration act of the post-war era,
was implemented to alleviate the serious refugee problem in war-torn
Europe. Enacted by Congress as a humanitarian measure, the DPA
granted entry visas to "eligible displaced persons" as defined by the
constitution of the International Refugee Organization (the "IRO").4
The requirements of the DPA had to be met before an applicant could
be admitted to the United States.47 Eligible displaced persons, defined
as victims of the Nazi regime or individuals persecuted because of race,
religion, national origin or political beliefs,48 became a "concern"49 of the
39. Id.
40. See DPA, supra note 10 and accompanying text.
41. Constitution of the International Refugee Organization, opened for signatre
December 16, 1946, 62 Stat. 3037, T.IA.S. No. 1846 [hereinafter IRO Constitution].
42. DPA, supra note 10, § 2(c). At the close of hostilities in Europe, the Allied armies
found themselves overseeing approximately 8,000,000 persons which included civilian
refugees, prisoners of war, and survivors of concentration camps. Seven million of these
uprooted individuals were repatriated by 1948 leaving some 1,000,000 displaced persons.
United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362, 1378 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
43. The atrocities committed by the Nazis were numerous. In Fedorenko, the District
Court described the operation of Treblinka, a concentration camp responsible for the death
of at least 800,000 individuals, as a "human abattoir" where prisoners were executed the
same day they arrived. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 901 n.12 (S.D. Fla.
1978). For a detailed description of camp operations see W. SHiRuE, THE Rtsn AND THE
FALL o THE THjRo RmcH 1967-74 (1960).
44. IRO Constitution, supra note 41, Annex I, Part II, at 3051.
45. DPA, supra note 10.
46. United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51, 64 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1981).
47. See DPA, supra note 10.
48. IRO Constitution, supra note 41, Annex I, Part I, at 3049. The IRO defines
refugees as:
(a) victims of the nazi or fascist regimes or of regimes which took part on
their side in the second world war, or of the quisling or similar regimes
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IRO and as a result, the DPA Elimination of normal immigration
quotas" allowed scores of individuals to enter the United States, thereby
easing the European refugee problem.51 Ineligible displaced persons who
collaborated with the Nazi regime were denied entry to the United
States.52 Consistent with the ideals of the IRO Constitution and that of
other civilized nations, the United States excluded suspected Nazi war
criminals from immigration. 3 Nevertheless, the majority of war criminals
that the government seeks to deport today, misrepresented themselves and
entered the country under the DPA5
Those seeking to enter the United States under the DPA after World
War II faced a series of complex procedures designed to screen
applicants for eligibility.55 As an adjunct of the IRO, the DPA drew
upon definitions contained in the IRO Constitution to establish criteria
for eligibility.-6 Before applying for admission under the DPA, a
candidate had to file for IRO assistance and pass a series of interviews.
57
which assisted them against the United Nations... ;
(c) persons who were considered refugees before the outbreak of the
second world war, for reasons of race, religion, nationality or political
opinion.
Id.
49. Id. Annex I, Part I, at 3049-52.
50. DPA, supra note 10, § 3(a).
51. IRO Constitution, supra note 41, preamble. The preamble mandates that the IRO
assist refugees in resettling. Id. Thus, it followed that the purpose of the DPA, an arm
of the IRO, was to relieve the refugee problem created by the war in Europe.
52. DPA, supra note 10, § 2(b) adopted the IRO's definition of a displaced person.
While defining an "eligible displaced person" the IRO also noted exceptions, stating in
pertinent part:
Persons who will not be the concern of the Organizaton.
1. War criminals, quislings and traitors.
2. Any other persons who can be shown:
(a) to have assisted the enemy in persecuting civil popula-
tions of countries, Members of the United Nations; or
(b) to have voluntarily assisted the enemy forces since the
outbreak of the second world war in their operations
against the United Nations.
1RO Constitution, supra note 41, Annex I, Part II, at 3051-52.
53. See generally IRO Constitution, supra note 45.
54. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981); United States v. Demjanjuk, 518
F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981); United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981);
United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Defendants in all the above
cases were at one time naturalized citizens.
55. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 495 (1981).
56. DPA, supra note 10, § 2(b), at 1009.
57. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 490; Denjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1378 The Denjanuk court
stated that an IRO officer would administer the interviews with emphasis on the applicant's
war-time activities. Id. The primary source of information was the applicant himself.
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Ironically, investigators relied solely on information supplied by the
applicant to determine eligibility.58 If successful, the applicant would
receive certification as an "eligible displaced person" within the meaning
of the IRO Constitution. 9 After IRO certification, the candidate could
then file an application under the DPA.
To implement its policy, the DPA established the Displaced Persons
Commission (the "DPC").6 The DPC became the final arbiter of an
applicant's eligibility for assistance under the DPA. 61 Refugees seeking
to enter the country bore the burden of proving their eligibility.
62
Unfortunately, DPC investigators did not interview applicants, but relied
exclusively on files supplied by the IRO to determine eligibility under the
DPA. 63 After an applicant passed both the IRO and DPC examinations,
INS officials issued visas, relying on scant files forwarded by the DPC.64
DPC investigators indicated that if a candidate disclosed participation in
Nazi persecution, application would be denied.6s Therefore, Nazis wishing
to enter the United States simply lied to investigators who did not
question the credibility of their testimony."
Under the DPA applicants were required to disclose truthful
information about their war-time activities.67  Section 10 of the DPA
specifically stated that an individual who willfully misrepresented himself
"for the purpose of gaining admission into the United States as an
eligible displaced person shall thereafter not be admissible into the
United States." Some Nazi war criminals who were granted United
Therefore, it was most likely that the official took the misleading statements by a
prospective immigrant at face value.
58. Fedorenko, 499 U.S. at 490.
59. Id.
60. Pursuant to the DPA, the Displaced Persons Commission, [the "DPC'], was created
"to carry out the provisions and accomplish the purposes of this Act." DPA, supra note
10,5 9.
61. Id. Though the DPC, was the final arbiter of who would qualify for DPC assistance,
the INS issued the entry visas. 1979 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 105 (statement of
Almanza Tripp, former Immigration and Naturalization Service officer stationed in Europe
under the DPA).
62.. DPA, supra note 10, § 10; see 8 U.S.C. § 1427(e) (1988).
63. 1979 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 106-08 (statement of Almanza Tripp, former
Immigration and Naturalization Service officer stationed in Europe with the Displaced
Persons Act).
64. Id. at 106.
65. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981). Approximately 12,134 persons
were refused visas under Section 13 of the DPA. Alleged Nazi War Criminals: Hearings
Before the Subcommn. on Immigration, Citizenslup, and International Law of the House Comm.
on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 86 (1978) [hereinafter 1978 House Hearings].
66. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text.
67. See DPA supra note 10.
68. DPA, supra note 10, § 10. Additionally, the DPA fined persons who knowingly
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States citizenship willfully misrepresented themselves to qualify for
immigration as displaced persons.69 Failure to disclose the truth about
war-time activities resulted in denial of admission to the United States
or revocation of an entry visa already issued! 0
Under normal conditions, the Immigration and Naturalization Service
investigated each applicant thoroughly, contacting relatives, friends and
employers to verify a candidate's statements. A growing refugee
population, prompted by upheaval in post-war Europe and the desire to
provide speedy relief,71 however, resulted in less than thorough investiga-
tions.n Lengthy investigations might have reduced immigration to a
trickle.Y The alternative might have been to leave pre-war immigration
quotas in place,74 thereby slowing Europe's recovery.
B. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952
Today, a suspected war criminal's citizenship is subject to revocation
under the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 (the "INA'). Section
1451(a) of the INA provides that a United States citizenship illegally
procured or "procured by concealment of a material fact or by willful
misrepresentation" must be revoked. 75 Legal entry into the United States
is a condition precedent to obtaining citizenship.76 In addition, Section
1451(a) provides a mechanism for revocation of citizenship but does not
mandate deportation, which is achieved through a separate proceeding.77
Cases against violators of immigration laws are instituted with the benefit
violated DPA provisions:
Any person or persons who knowingly violate or conspire to violate any provision
of this Act, except section 9, shall be guilty of a felony, and upon conviction
thereof shall be fined not less than $500 nor more than $10,000, or shall be
imprisoned not less than two or more than ten years, or both.
Id. § 14.
69. United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981). But see United States
v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1985). Defendant Elmars Sprogis truthfully reported his
war-time activities as a Latvian police chief, however, no investigation was conducted at the
time of his immigration.
70. DPA, supra note 10, § 10.
71. 1978 House Hearings, supra note 65, at 103.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 103-04. Testimony indicated that a thorough investigation, including inquiries
to the Berlin document center which supplied information on war criminals would have
caused "a 3-week breakdown in the Program." Id.
74. Abrams, American Immigration Policy: How Strait the Gate?, 45 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 137, 138 (1982).
75. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1988). For a definition of a materiality, see supra note 15.
76. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1988).
77. Id.
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of information not available to the DPA immediately after World War
II, as well as the time to do exhaustive investigations.78
II. DENATURALIZATION CASES INVOLVING NAZI WAR CRIMINALS
Between the end of World War II and the mid-1970s, no action was
taken to expel Nazi war criminals who illegally entered7 the United
States in violation of the DPA and the INA.8 Most suspected Nazi war
criminals entered the United States representing themselves as "eligible
displaced persons" 81 under the DPA and remained in the United States
unimpeded by prosecution until the late 1970s.82 The United States
Government's failure to pursue Nazi war criminals and enforce immigra-
tion laws allowed those individuals statutorily forbidden from entering the
country to enter and to remain long enough to become naturalized
citizens.n Once a naturalized citizen, a suspected Nazi war criminal must
be denaturalized and deported in separate proceedings.8
In the late 1970s, the United States Government renewed its
commitment to bring war criminals to justice. The Special Litigation
Unit was organized to pursue Nazi war criminals.8 The Unit's primary
78. See supra notes 55-66 and accompanying text.
79. Illegal procurement is defined as failing to comply with the prerequisites to the
acquisition of citizenship. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506 (1980).
80. Part of the reason for the failure to prosecute Nazi war criminals has been blamed
on the United States' obsession with fighting communism. 1978 House Hearings, supra note
65, at 12 (Response by the Honorable Joshua Eilberg to the Carey Report). In addition,
poor cooperation from communist block countries in the United States investigations has
stopped the flow of information essential to denaturalization cases. See GAO REPORT,
supra note 86, at 13-14.
81. DPA, supra note 10.
82. On October 30, 1978, President Carter renewed the American commitment to uphold
the principles of The London Agreement, supra, note 1, by signing a bill to deport Nazi
collaborators that entered the country after 1952. See Immigration and Nationality Act of
1952, Pub. L. No. 95-549, 92 Stat. 2065 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988));
see also supra note 75; United States v. Fedorenko 597 F.2d 946 (5th Cir. 1979); United
States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981); United States v. Linnas, 527 F.
Supp. 426 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Koziy, 540 F. Supp. 25 (S.D. Fla. 1982).
These cases illustrate that suspected war criminals acquired citizenship and remained in the
United States free from prosecution until the late 1970s, and in the Koziy case, until 1981.
83. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 490; United States v. Sokolov, 814 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1987);
Maikovskis v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 773 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1985);
Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1362; Linnas, 527 F. Supp. at 426; United States v. Osidach, 513
F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
84. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1988).
85. U.S. CoMP. GEN. REPORT, WIDESPREAD CONSPIRACY To OBsTRUcr PROCESS OF
ALLEGED NAzi WAR CRIMINALS NOrr SUPPORTED BY AvAiLABLE EVIDENCE - CONTROVERSY
MAY CONTINUE BY THE COM7TROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, WIDESPREAD
CONSPIRACY TO OBsTRucT PROBES OF ALLEGED NAZI WAR CiMINALs NOT SUPPORTED BY
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function was, and continues to be, to "expedite investigations and
prosecutions of Nazi war criminals."8' Since its inception, virtually all
prosecution of Nazi war criminals in United States courts has been
handled by the UnitY7
In addition to the Unit's efforts, in 1978, Congress amended the
Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 to expand the definition of
excludable individuals.8 The amendment was designed to facilitate the
deportation of aliens that persecuted civilian populations during the Nazi
reign89 The amendment incorporated into permanent law, provisions that
previously only appeared in special refugee acts such as the DPA."
Under the amendment, the government has the power to deport anyone
that "ordered, incited, assisted or otherwise participated in the persecu-
tion of any person because of race, religion, national origin, or political
opinion" between March 23, 1933 ind May 8, 1945.91 The requirement
that the suspect be convicted of a crime before the government could
take action was eliminated.f Unquestionably, the new law facilitates
government prosecution," however, it has not hastened deportation and
AVAIIABLE EVIDENCE - CONTROVERSY MAY CONTINUE at v (May 15,1978) [hereinafter GAO
REORT].
86. Id.
87. Letter from Diane Kelly, Administrative Officer of the Office of Special Investiga-
tions, Criminal Divisions, in Washington, D.C. to David Birnbaum (Mar. 14, 1989) (on file
at the office of N.Y.L ScH. J. INT'L & CoMp. L.).
88. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 95-549, 92 Stat. 2065 (codified
as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988)).
89. H.R. REP. No. 1452, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., repinted in, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws 4700, 4700.
90. Id. at 4702.
91. 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (a)(33) (1988). Section 1182(a)(33) allows the government to
exclude:
(33) Any alien who during the period beginning on March 23, 1933, and ending May
8, 1945, under the direction of, or in association with-
(A) the Nazi government in Germany,
(B) any government in any area occupied by the military forces
of the Nazi government of Germany, or
(C) any government established with the assistance or coopera-
tion of the Nazi government of Germany, or
(D) any government which was an ally of the Nazi government
of Germany, ordered, incited, assisted, or otherwise par-
ticipated in the persecution of any person because of race,
religion, national origin, or political opinion.
Id.
92. Id. Congressional history suggests that the amendment expanded the meaning of
the law to include non-physical harm. H.R. REP. No. 1452, 95th Cong., 2d Ses., reprinted
in, 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4700, 4704.
93. See United States v. Sokolov, 814 F.2d 864 (2d Cir. 1987) (under the amended law
the government was able to denaturalize the defendant for authoring Nazi propaganda).
1990)
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denaturalization procedures.94
Naturalized citizens are afforded the same rights and privileges as
persons born in the United States.91 Because United States citizenship
is a priceless treasure, a heavy burden is placed on the government in
attempting to prove that a defendant misrepresented himself.96 In order
to succeed in denaturalization cases, the government must prove its case
by "'clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence which does not leave the
issue in doubt'... .97 Therefore, unless the government rests its case
without any doubts, the suspected Nazi war criminal retains his certificate
of citizenship.
A. The Chaunt Materiality Test
In Chaunt v. United States,98 the Supreme Court established a test
to determine what constitutes a material misrepresentation on an
application for entry into the United States." To prove that a defendant
misrepresented or concealed a material fact, it must be found that "(1)
facts were suppressed 'which, if known, would have warranted denial of
citizenship' or (2) that their disclosure 'might have been useful in an
investigation possibly leading to the discovery of other facts warranting
denial of citizenship.' 'u 0
In Chaunt, the defendant failed to report three arrests in the United
States, which occurred subsequent to obtaining an entry visa, and prior
to the issuance of naturalized citizenship.101 The Court found that the
arrests would not have resulted in a denial of the certificate of naturaliz-
ation, nor would these facts have prompted an investigation leading to a
denial of citizenship, and thus, the misrepresentation was not material:0
The Court held that the government must prove that the concealed facts,
if known, would have resulted in denial of citizenship, or would have led
to an investigation resulting in deniallm Applying the Chaunt materiality
94. The amendment did not change the procedure of denaturalization and deportation.
See 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (1988).
95. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating that "[aill persons born or naturalized in the
United States ... are citizens of the United States ... ").
96. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 898 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
97. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 158 (1943) (quoting Maxwell Land
Grant Case, 121 U.S. 325, 381 (1887)).
98. 364 U.S. 350 (1960).
99. See RESrATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS §538 (1976).
100. Chaunt v. United States, 364 U.S. 350, 355 (1960).
101. Id. at 352.
102. Id. at 355.
103. Id
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test to the case of a suspected Nazi war criminal, concealment is material
because possible involvement in Nazi war crimes constitutes a fact that
if known, would bar entry and citizenship. 10 4
The Court distinguished Chaunt in Fedorenko. Chaunt involved
misrepresentation on a naturalization application, whereas Fedorenko
involved a misrepresentation on a visa application prior to immigration.1M
In Fedorenko, the Court held that the Chaunt materiality test only applied
to cases involving misrepresentation at the time of naturalization.M In
a concurring opinion, however, Justice Blackmun stated that there was
virtually no difference between false information given at the time of
entry or at the time of naturalization.107 Although the Court refused to
apply the Chaunt materiality test in Fedorenko, the test is still used by
lower courts to determine whether a defendant's false statements were
material.M
The material misrepresentation requirement protects naturalized
citizens from being denaturalized as a result of inconsequential or
unsubstantiated allegations. At the time of immigration, or application
for citizenship, the government must demonstrate that there was willful
misrepresentation. 109 Once citizenship is attained, however, the govern-
ment must prove that such misrepresentation was both willful and
material. If truthful disclosure of personal history would have denied the
applicant citizenship, such misrepresentation is considered material. 10
War crimes were considered material per se because if disclosed, they
would have barred immigration under the DPA and the INA. Thus, Nazi
war criminals residing in the United States who did not fully disclose
war-time activities illegally entered the United States through willful and
material misrepresentation. Consequently, their citizenship was illegally
procured and is subject to revocation.1
104. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 499 (1981).
105. Id. at 508-09.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 518 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
108. Maikovskis v. Immigration & Naturalization Service, 773 F.2d 435, 441 (1985)
(stating that all circuit courts regard the Chaunt test as applicable to misrepresentations in
visa applications); see also United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio
1981); United States v. Unnas, 527 F. Supp. 426, 440 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v.
Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51 (E.D. Pa. 1981). These cases used the Chaunt test to determine
materiality.
109. Demianjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 416; Osidach, 513 F. Supp. at 51.
110. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 916 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
111. Naturalization is "'illegally procured' if some statutory requirement which is a
condition precedent to naturalization is absent at the time the petition for naturalization
is granted." Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1380 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st
Sess. 39, reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMiN. NEws 2950, 2983 (1961)).
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B. Fedorenko v. United States
Fedorenko v. United States, "2 is widely accepted as the most sig-
nificant denaturalization case.I13 It marked the first time the Court
affirmed the revocation of a Nazi war criminal's citizenship.' Fedorenko
was the first, and only, Nazi war criminal to be successfully denatural-
ized,"15 deported1 1 6 and subsequently executed.1 7  Although the District
Court ruled in favor of the defendant1 1 8 because the government did not
meet its burden of proof,119 the Fifth Circuit reversed the lower court's
opinion. 0 Ultimately, the case was affirmed by the Supreme Court.2 1
Thus, Fedorenko v. United States is an important precedent that has since
been followed32
Nearly thirty years passed from the time Fedorenko immigrated to
the United States until the time the government instituted an action
against him.m  Similar to actions instituted against suspected war
criminals presently residing in the United States,'24 the government had
the burden of proving "by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence,
which [didi not leave the issue in doubt,"12S that the defendant made
misrepresentations on his visa application.'2 The government had to
prove that Fedorenko materially and willfully misrepresented himself for
the purpose of entering the United States and obtaining a naturalization
112. 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
113. See cases cited supra note 19.
114. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
115. Id.
116. Hermine Braunsteiner Ryan was extradited after voluntarily consenting to
denaturalization. 1979 House Hearings, supra note 3, at 64-70 (statement of Anthony
Devito, former Immigration and Naturalization Service investigator).
117. N.Y. Times, July 28, 1987, § 1, at 3, col. 5.
118. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
119. Id. at 921.
120. United States v. Fedorenko, 597 F.2d 946, 954 (5th Cir. 1979).
121. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
122. United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d. 115, 121 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v.
Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981); United States v. Linnas, 527 F. Supp. 426,
428 (E.D.N.Y. 1981); United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1981).
123. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 896 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
124. See Dermjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. at 1362; Linnas, 527 F. Supp. at 426; Osidach, 513
F. Supp. at 51.
125. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 158 (1943).
126. Id.
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certificate. 127 The government prevailed in the case by illustrating that
Fedorenko lacked the "good moral character" necessary to enter the
United States and to acquire citizenship under the INA due to
Fedorenko's war-time activities.12
Fedorenko, a soldier in the Russian army, was captured by the
Germans and was held as a prisoner of war.' Although a prisoner, he
was selected to serve at Treblinka, a concentration camp in Poland. 0
Fedorenko claimed that after receiving training, he was involuntarily
assigned to serve as a guard in the Nazi concentration camp. 1  As a
guard he was issued a uniform and a gun,32 received a stipend, and was
allowed to leave the camp for hours at a time. 33 Fedorenko served as
an armed guard from 1942 until the end of the war. TL Six witnesses were
able to identify Fedorenko and testified against him at his trialY5
Fedorenko argued that involuntary service as a guard was indistin-
guishable from involuntary service as a concentration camp inmate; if
inmates were not held liable for their actions, then he should not be held
liable for his actions as a guard.Y' The District Court held that there
was no distinction between inmates who involuntarily cut the hair of
female inmates before execution and involuntary service as a guard1 7
When the case was brought before the Supreme Court, Fedorenko argued
that if a guard who served involuntarily was convicted, inmates who
involuntarily assisted in the persecution of civilians should also be
convicted of war crimes. The Court, however, distinguished armed
guards, who received pay and could leave the grounds of the camp, from
inmates who were forced to serve involuntarily, who could not leave the
camp and received no pay.' Thus, an armed guard who was free to
regularly leave the concentration camp fit the statutory description of one
who persecuted civilians and should have been barred from entering the
127. See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1988).
128. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 493 (1981).
129. Id. at 494.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 513-14. Fedorenko lied to officials of the DPC about his activities during
the war. He told the investigators that he had been a farmer in Poland and then was
deported to Germany when witnesses placed him at Treblinka. Id. at 496.
132. Id. at 494.
133. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 912-13 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
134. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 494 (1981).
135. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. at 901.
136. Id at 913.
137. Id.
138. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 511, 512 n.34.
139. Id.
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United States.140
Fedorenko testified that he did not disclose his war-time activities
on either his 1949 application for admission to the United States as a
displaced person or his 1970 application for a naturalization certificate
in order to avoid repatriation to Russia.1 41  Fedorenko informed
investigators from the DPC that he was a farmer in Poland from 1937
to March 1942 at which time he was deported to Germany and forced
to work in a factory until the end of the war.142 These statements were
consistent with those made to the vice council, whose task it was to
review applications for final approval.10 Testimony at the trial confirmed
that if investigators from the DPC or the vice council had been aware of
Fedorenko's activities as an armed guard, whether it was voluntary or
involuntary, Fedorenko's entry would have been denied as a matter of
policy.1 " In addition, Fedorenko failed to disclose his war-time activities
to the INS when he applied for naturalization. Despite his continuous
misrepresentations, Fedorenko was granted United States citizenship in
1970.145
Fedorenko was not among the class of individuals intended to benefit
from the DPA or the IRO. 146 Upon entering the United States,
Fedorenko willfully misrepresented himself as an eligible displaced person
for the purpose of obtaining citizenship.1 47 By concealing his war-time
activities as an armed guard at the Nazi death camp, Treblinka,10 he
violated Section 10 of the DPA 14 9 Such misrepresentation constituted a
violation of immigration regulations which, if discovered at the time of
his application, would have rendered Fedorenko's entry illegal.uo0 It was
the policy of the IRO, the DPC, and immigration officials to deny entry
to those who had "assisted the enemy in persecuting civil[ian]" t1s
populationsYt52 The Court thus determined "that disclosure of the true
facts about the petitioner's service as an armed guard at Treblinka would,
as a matter of law, have made him ineligible for a visa under the DPA
140. Id.
141. Id at 507.
142. Id. at 496-97.
143. Id. at 511-12.
144. Id. at 510, 512 n.32.
145. United States v. Fedorenko, 455 F. Supp. 893, 895 (S.D. Fla. 1978).
146. DPA, supra note 10; IRO Constitution, supra note 41, Annex I at 3049.
147. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a) (1988).
148. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 514 (1981).
149. DPA, supra note 10, § 10.
150. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506 (1981).
151. IRO Constitution, supra note 45, Annex I, Part II, at 3051.
152. Id.
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.... 153 Fedorenko's misrepresentations were therefore material under
the Chaunt test.
Fedorenko's citizenship was illegally procured and subject to
revocation under Section 340(a) of the INA.' 4 In addition, having served
as an armed guard, Fedorenko was not "attached to the principles of the
Constitution"115 and therefore lacked the "good moral character"
necessary to become a United States citizenY'
Although the government sustained its burden of proof in Fedorenko,
by clear and convincing evidence, it took four years for deportation to
occur. 157  The first proceeding only served to revoke Fedorenko's
citizenship;m the government then had to successfully prove its case a
second time in a deportation hearing, which it did.139
C. Post-Fedorenko Cases: Demjanjuk and Sprogis
In denaturalization cases adjudicated since Fedorenko, the constitu-
tional rights of alleged Nazi war criminals have been protected.
Although the government has compiled an extensive list of suspected
Nazi war criminals residing in the United States,1  only a select few have
been brought to trial.16' This trend indicates that the government will not
bring a weak or frivolous case to trial.16 In cases thus far, when the
government unequivocally proves its case for willful misrepresentation, the
defendant is denaturalized.1 63 On the other hand, when the government
fails to prove its case by "clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence,"
the defendant is invariably acquitted. 164 There is no evidence to suggest
that a naturalized citizen has ever been unjustly accused of being a Nazi
war criminal and consequently denaturalized; nor has an individual been
153. Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 513 (1981).
154. Current version at 8 U.S.C. 1 1451(a) (1988).
155. See id. §1427(a).
156. See id § 1427(a). This section imposes upon immigrants the requirement of good
moral character. Id Fedorenko's activities as a concentration camp guard were evidence
of his lack of good moral character.
157. N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1984, § 1, at 12, col. 3.
158. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (1988).
159. See 1979 House Hearings, supra note 3.
160. See H. Friedlander & E. Malarrick, Nazi Cr"minals in the United States: Denaturali-
zation after Fedorenko, in 3 SIMON WEISENT-AL CENTER ANNUAL 47 (1985).
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. See cases cited supra note 2.
164. United States v. Sprogis, 763 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1985) (both defendants were
acquitted when the government failed to meet its burden of proof).
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proven innocent subsequent to deportation. 16
Two cases best exemplify the pattern the courts have followed since
the Supreme Court's decision in Fedorenko: United States v. Demjanjuk, 6
and United States v. Sprogis.167 These cases illustrate the divergent paths
denaturalization cases may take. In Demjanjuk, the defendant was
deported and is currently appealing a death sentence in Israel. In
Sprogis, the defendant retained citizenship and remained in the United
States. These cases demonstrate the court's reluctance to denaturalize
a citizen unless the government proves willful material misrepresentation
"by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence." 16
John (Ivan) Demjanjuk acquired citizenship under circumstances
startlingly similar to that of Fedorenko-Demjanjuk willfully mis-
represented himself for the purpose of obtaining United States citizen-
ship.'6 When Demjanjuk applied for a visa under the DPA, he failed to
disclose his service as an armed guard at the Treblinka concentration
camp.' 70 Like Fedorenko, Demjanjuk had been captured by the German
army and forced to serve as a guard involuntarily. In addition, he
continued his deception in subsequent naturalization application
procedures and interviews.17' Based on these false representations,
Demjanjuk was granted United States citizenship in 1958.2
Relying on the testimony of six survivors of Treblinka 173 and the
defendant's identification card (containing a photograph, signature, and
physical description of him), 74 the government sustained its burden,
proving that Demjanjuk violated Section 10 of the DPA by illegally
entering the United States. Therefore, he was subject to denaturalization
under Section 340(a) of the INA.17 Like Fedorenko, Demjanjuk lost his
denaturalization case but was able to avoid deportation for three years
due to the lengthy deportation proceedings.
165. There are no known cases where a defendant was later found innocent. Once
deported, Fedorenko was found guilty of war crimes in a Russian court. Demjanjuk was
found guilty of similar offenses in Israel.
166. 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
167. 763 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1985).
168. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 158 (1943).
169. United States v. Demjanjuk, 518 F. Supp. 1362 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
170. Id. at 1378-79.
171. Id. at 1380.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 1369-73.
174. Id. at 1366-68. Expert testimony determined that the document was "a service
identification card" issued by the SS, an elite corps of the Nazi military. Id. at 1366.
175. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
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In United States v. Sprogis,t76 the government was not able to sustain
its burden of proof.177 Unlike other cases discussed herein, the defendant
in Sprogis did not misrepresent himself to the government on his visa or
naturalization applications.1'8  Elmars Sprogis truthfully reported his
service as a police officer in the town of Latvia. Despite his disclosure,
the government attempted to denaturalize him, arguing that he illegally
procured his citizenship because as a police officer he was not eligible
for a visa under Sections 10 and 13 of the DPA. 179
Unlike Fedorenko and Demjanjuk, who were members of an
organization barred by the United States, Sprogis's activities were not
prima facie evidence warranting a denial of citizenship.18 It is unclear
whether Latvian police officers were hostile to the civilian population,
and there was no evidence that Sprogis, himself, committed any acts
constituting persecution of civilians.181 Without sufficient evidence, the
government fell short of its burden and the Court ruled in favor of
Sprogis. tl 2
IV. THE AFTERMATH OF THE DENATURALIZATION CASES
Evidence suggests that the government is highly selective in bringing
cases involving Nazi war criminals to trial.ln In 1982, the United States
Department of Justice maintained files on approximately 200 suspected
Nazi war criminals, yet only a fraction of these cases were ever brought
before the courts."l " This suggests that the government will not institute
denaturalization proceedings unless there is an overwhelmingly strong
case.
Of the few denaturalization cases brought to trial, the government
must prove its case "by clear, unequivocal and convincing evidence...
leav[ing] no issue in doubt"1 a to succeed.186 In Fedorenko and Demjanjuk,
willful and material misrepresentation was demonstrated "by clear,
176. 763 F.2d 115 (2d Cir. 1985).
177. United States v. Sprogis, No. CV-82-1804, slip op. at 1579-80 (E.D.N.Y. May 18,
1984).
178. Id. at 1501.
179. Id. at 1498.
180. Id. at 1501.
181. Id. at 1578.
182. Id. at 1580.
183. See supra notes 174-176 and accompanying text.
184. Note, Denaturalization of Nazi War Criminal After Fedorenko, 15 N.Y.U. J. IL
L. & Pot.- 169 (1982); see sources cited supra note 88 and accompanying text.
185. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 158 (1943).
186. Id.
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unequivocal and convincing evidence that [left] no issue in doubt." 187 In
addition, Fedorenko and Demjanjuk, both armed concentration camp
guards, lacked the "good moral character" necessary to acquire citizenship
as a matter of law. Yet, after the defendants were denaturalized, they
remained free from prosecution in the United States while awaiting
deportation.
In Sprogis, on the other hand, the government could not meet its
stringent burden of proof. Sprogis made no willful misrepresentations,
but instead, candidly reported his service as police chief of Latvia.
Sprogis's service, unlike Fedorenko's and Demjanjuk's, was not per se
evidence that he lacked "good moral character." When the government
failed to prove that Sprogis committed war crimes by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, the case was dismissed.
The constitutional right of naturalized Nazi war criminals to an
appeal has been unfailingly upheld in denaturalization proceedings M
Because denaturalization does not result in automatic deportation, a
defendant may argue his case a second time in a deportation proceeding,
and the government must twice bear its burden of proof. Consequently,
the United States policy and obligation to bring to justice those
individuals who assisted the Nazi regime is not being effectuated.
V. CONCLUSION
Nearly fifty years after World War II "the holocaust lives fresh in
[the] memories"18 ' of those who survived the war. The courts recognize
that
[r]ather than putting this black period out of our minds, we must
resolve to never forget the abominable atrocities inflicted at the
hands of Hitler's Nazis and those who would follow the madman.
Whatever our faith, we must ensure that our children are taught
well the lessons we have learned so that history can never repeat
itself.19D
It is true that our emotions should not "cloud our judgment nor move us
to reach decisions unsupported by the quantum of evidence the law
requires." 191 The courts are capable of addressing the complex issues
surrounding the deportation of Nazi war criminals in a single denaturali-
187. Id.
188. See Comment, supra note 31 and accompanying text.
189. United States v. Sprogis, No. CV-82-1804, slip op. at 1579 (E.D.N.Y. May 18, 1984).
190. Id. at 1579-80.
191. Id. at 1580.
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zation/deportation proceeding. If denaturalization is warranted, the judge
may immediately rule on deportation.192 If the decision calls for both
denaturalization and deportation, the defendant is free to appeal the case
to as high an authority as the Supreme Court. Although the appeal
process may take four years, the denaturalization/deportation decision
would be final, and the defendant would no longer be at liberty to
remain a free person in the United States while awaiting a separate
deportation hearing. The courts should at the very least, however, be
allowed to hear all the evidence pertaining to suspected Nazi war
criminals in one, expedited proceeding.
David Birnbaum
192. It has been suggested that Congress could entrust the courts with the deportation
function. 1 C. GORDON & H. ROSENFIELD, IMMIGRAMON LAw AND PROCEDURE § 5.1, at 6
(1988). The courts have in fact had some power over the deportation procedure in the
past. See United States v. Woo Jan, 245 U.S. 552 (1918).

